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Being good in business is the most fascinating kind of art.3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Artists have always loved to hate the art market. It degrades the ineffable “aura” 
of their work by relinquishing it to commerce. Still they hunger for its approval. The 
art market reifies art by reducing it to a price, but also promises artists untold fame, 
fortune, and freedom. While it cannot give artists what they want, it can give them 
what they need, if they are lucky enough to catch its fancy. The alternative is 
irrelevance. So artists accept the art market out of necessity. The only question is 
how they engage with it. 
In theory, the art market is just where artists go to sell their work—to alienate it 
by transferring ownership to a collector. But the alienation of a work of art is not as 
simple as the sale of typical goods or services. Artwork is not just a commodity and 
is never fully alienated. When artists sell their work, they retain a connection to it. 
The artist’s name and reputation will always be attached to the work, and just as the 
work may help build the artist’s name and reputation if acquired by a  
well-known collector or a fancy museum or lauded by an influential critic, so the 
artist’s later activities may affect the value of their work after the fact. 
As a consequence, artists have always claimed certain “moral rights” in their 
works, with varying degrees of success. Usually, property owners can use their 
property in any way they like. If you own a t-shirt and get tired of it, you can use it 
as a rag or throw it away. Or if you own a pair of jeans, you can cut off the legs and 
make shorts. But moral rights may prevent the owner of an artwork from changing 
or destroying it. For example, the moral right of integrity may prevent the owner of 
an artwork from damaging it. Notably, these moral rights may apply long after an 
artwork is purchased, and even if the buyer didn’t agree to them. Different countries 
recognize different moral rights, and the United States recognizes only limited moral 
rights, but the very existence of moral rights suggests that artwork is “special” in 
some way, normatively distinct from other forms of property.  
Unsurprisingly, artists like moral rights, and want more. Among other things, 
they want money. Specifically, they want a bigger cut of the art market. Initially, 
artists just wanted their patrons to pay more for art. But when a sophisticated 
secondary art market first emerged in the late 19th century, and when it exploded in 
the mid-to-late-20th century, artists began to demand a percentage of the resale price 
of their works. As the resale prices of the most desirable works skyrocketed, in part 
due to the “appreciation” in the name and reputation of their creators, the artists 
clamored ever more vigorously for a share of the secondary market for their works. 
In response, many countries created resale royalty rights, which enable artists to 
claim a percentage of the resale price of their artwork. The United States has not. 
While Congress has considered many bills proposing the creation of a federal resale 
royalty right, it has rejected all of them. And while California created a state resale 
                                                                                                             
 
3 ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL (FROM A TO B AND BACK AGAIN) 92 (1975). 
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royalty right in 1976, the Ninth Circuit recently held that it is preempted by the 
Copyright Act.4 
The normative case for statutory resale royalty rights is weak.5 But mandatory 
legislation may not be the only way for artists to claim resale royalties and other 
“moral rights” of various sorts. Perhaps they could negotiate the rights and royalties 
via contract. Artists typically sell their works to collectors on the primary market. 
While artists usually sell their works outright, in theory, nothing prevents them from 
retaining a residual interest in their works. Indeed, some artists have sold works 
pursuant to contracts that entitle them to “moral rights” and to a percentage of the 
resale price of the works and that require future buyers to agree to the same terms. 
This Article focuses on the best-known example, the “Artist’s Contract” developed 
by Seth Siegelaub and Robert Projansky in 1971.6 This contract was promulgated as 
a tool for artists to use in selling their works, retaining numerous rights in their art, 
including resale royalty rights and numerous expansive moral rights, extending 
beyond the artist’s lifetime.  
Legal doctrines currently stand in the way of contracts such as the Artist’s 
Contract. While such contracts may be enforceable against the original buyer, who 
is a party to the contract, they are not enforceable against subsequent buyers, who 
are not. The artist may be able to recover damages from the original buyer but cannot 
compel subsequent buyers to agree to pay royalties and respect rights. Similarly, 
property law generally prohibits servitudes on personal property, and contractual 
resale royalties and additional “moral rights” amount to servitudes on artwork. 
Typically, servitudes on personal property are inefficient, because the transaction 
costs exceed the benefits. But sometimes they could make sense. In theory, resale 
royalties are just futures contracts that artists can use to hedge against success, and 
the market price of a work will be discounted to reflect the current value of the resale 
royalty. There is a good argument that the law should honor such contracts. Artists 
and collectors have different risk preferences, so perhaps they should be able to 
contract for whatever terms they like.7  
                                                                                                             
 
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1976), invalidated by Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1076 
(9th Cir. 2018).  
5 See generally Brian L. Frye, Equitable Resale Royalties, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237 (2017) 
(discussing the justifications for a statutory resale right). 
6 SETH SIEGELAUB & ROBERT PROJANSKY, THE ARTIST’S RESERVED RIGHTS TRANSFER AND SALE 
AGREEMENT 1 (1971) [hereinafter ARTIST’S CONTRACT], http://primaryinformation.org/files/english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KD7Y-5EE4]. 
7 There are a number of trenchant legal and economic analyses of moral rights, resale royalties, and 
related issues. See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 
1, (2014); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Royalties for Artists versus Royalties for Authors and 
Composers, 25 J. CULTURAL ECON. 259 (2001); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and 
Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 95 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95–96 (1997). 
As one of us has shown, the enforceability “problem” of the artist’s contract can actually be “solved” 
through modern business entity law, although administrative and legal obstacles may remain. See 
Christopher G. Bradley, Art LLCs: Sculpting Property Rights Through Private Agreement, TULANE L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3337211 
[https://perma.cc/KYD7-4FLJ]. 
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But enforceability was never central to the Artist’s Contract. Indeed, actually 
using the Artist’s Contract was almost beside the point. After all, as Stewart 
Macaulay famously observed, even when breached, contracts are rarely enforced in 
court.8 While contractual agreements often reflect a mutual understanding, even 
sophisticated parties rarely haggle over every term, or litigate when their 
expectations are frustrated.9 Business dealings in practice tend to be more relational, 
informal, and ad hoc than traditional legal doctrine suggests. 
The primary purpose of the Artist’s Contract was to use legal rhetoric to make an 
ideological point and to promote particular forms of social change. By “legalizing” 
the relationship between an artist and a collector, the Artist’s Contract expressed the 
expectations of the artists who insisted on it; it obtained the collector’s statement of 
assent to the artist’s preferred re-framing of the post-sale relationship of artist, 
collector, and artwork; and it bolstered artists’ status and solidarity as a class of 
market actors. As one leading scholar of the contract and its milieu puts it, the Artist’s 
Contract deploys a “rhetoric of collectivity [that] can be viewed as a radical 
appropriation of private law in an effort to establish more equitable art industry 
norms.”10  
We note that that this phenomenon is far from unusual. Socio-legal scholars have 
long noted that legal language and legal tools are often deployed in service of goals 
other than establishing or enforcing existing legal rights. The law can be seen as a 
tool, and a reflection, of a particular form of “legal consciousness.”11 As scholars of 
legal consciousness have shown, sometimes the tools of law are deployed to 
demonstrate the injustice of the law, or of a particular social context; to signal 
seriousness, a shift from a personal or informal, negotiable relationship to one 
mediated by more objective, predetermined rules; or to catalyze political change by 
inspiring a particular community to claim hitherto-unrecognized rights or status. The 
Artist’s Contract serves as an apt illustration of the use of legal terms and tools (viz., 
                                                                                                             
 
8 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55, 60−62 (1963). 
9 See id. at 61.  
10 Lauren van Haaften-Schick, Conceptualizing Artists’ Rights: Circulations of the Siegelaub-
Projansky Agreement through Art and Law, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE 1 (2018) (citing NAWC to 
Issue New Contract, ART WORKERS NEWSLETTER (Nat’l Art Workers Cmty., New York, N.Y.), May 
1971), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199935352-e-27?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/AT62-3ECX]. 
11 See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM 
EVERYDAY LIFE 3–54 (1998) (providing an influential framework of analysis of “legal consciousness”); 
SALLY MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE OR GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS 
AMERICANS 37–63 (1990) (discussing legal consciousness); David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal 
Culture, 29 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2004); Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOCIAL SCI. 323 (2005) (providing historically contextualized, critical survey of the field). 
Stated most generally, “[t]he study of legal consciousness is the search for the forms of participation and 
interpretation through which actors construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend the circulating (contested or 
hegemonic) structures of meanings concerning law.” Id. at 334. 
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contracts) to bring social change, to intervene in the social and economic 
arrangements reflected in the art market.12 
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the rhetoric of the Artist’s Contract, rather 
than its substance. While the Artist’s Contract was always largely unenforceable as 
a matter of law, the available evidence suggests that some artists used it, and some 
collectors still observed its terms. It impacted the way these artists and collectors 
perceived their relationship to each other. While by any account its impact fell short 
of its originators’ hopes, it might have fulfilled more of those hopes than a traditional 
legal analysis would suggest. At any rate its failure (if it should be called that) was 
less as a legal document than as an attempt to catalyze social change. 
This paper explores the function and purpose of the Artist’s Contrast as a legal 
document—but not from the perspective of legal enforceability, which is how legal 
effectiveness is traditionally measured. Rather this paper tells the story of a document 
that relies upon hallmarks of law (legal language, formality, specificity, and so on) 
in order to express and attempt to consolidate particular views on artists, artworks, 
the collectors to whom they sell, and the markets in which they sell. This powerful 
connection inevitably continues past the moment of sale, and the Artist’s Contract 
can be read as an attempt to rearrange this connection, to intervene and alter it, to 
adjust the perspectives of all those participating in it or observing it—all by means 
of a particular, peculiar legal document. By our account, the goal of the document 
was to rearrange relationships of creators and buyers of art not just in particular 
transactions but on a much broader scale: to reshape norms of the marketplace and 
conceptions of the relevant rights and responsibilities of market participants. It is in 
the context of these complex social, cultural, and economic webs that the legal 
document in question can be best understood. 
 
I.  AN ARTIST’S RIGHTS IN WORKS OF ART 
 
Artists typically have an assortment of different rights in the works they create. 
Like all other authors, artists own a copyright when they create an original work of 
authorship.13 But artists may also have certain moral rights.14 In many countries, 
those moral rights may include a resale royalty right.15 
 
A.  Copyright in Works of Art 
 
Artists typically own a copyright in the works of art they create. The Berne 
Convention requires its signatories to extend copyright protection to all authors, 
                                                                                                             
 
12 van Haaften-Schick aptly terms these aspects the “social life of contracts.” van Haaften-Schick, 
supra note 10, at 21–24. 
13 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012). 
15 See Frye, supra note 5, at 241−46. 
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including artists.16 Most non-Berne countries still provide copyright protection in 
some form.17 
In the United States, the Copyright Act grants authors certain exclusive rights in 
the “original works of authorship” they create.18 Accordingly, if an artist creates an 
original work of authorship, then copyright in the work initially vests in the artist.19 
The exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act may vary depending on the 
category of the work of authorship.20 Typically, artists create “pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works,”21 but contemporary artists may create works that fall into another 
category, or no category.  
Copyright, however, may not protect all works of art. For example, artists may 
create works that copyright cannot protect because they are not “original” as defined 
by the Copyright Act.22 Minimalist and conceptual art often fails to satisfy the 
originality requirement.23 In addition, copyright may not protect works that fall 
outside of the enumerated categories of works of authorship.24 
Notably, copyright only protects intangible “works of authorship,” not tangible 
“copies” of those works. Accordingly, when an artist creates a unique painting, 
drawing, or sculpture, copyright protects the intangible work of authorship it 
embodies, not the object itself, which is merely a unique “copy” of the work.25 And 
when the artist sells that copy to a collector, the artist retains the copyright in the 
work.26 Of course, the artist may license the copyright in the work to the collector or 
anyone else, and many uses of the work are non-infringing, including public 
exhibition of the copy and reproduction permitted by fair use.27 
Yet, for many artists, copyright is essentially irrelevant. Copyright enables 
authors to internalize some of the positive externalities created by their work of 
authorship by giving them the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute their work. 
But most artists don’t sell copies, they sell originals. The art market is not a 
commodity market, but a scarcity market. 
 
                                                                                                             
 
16 See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, Sept. 9, 
1886, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
17 Currently, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, and San Marino are among the few countries that are not signatories 
to the Berne Convention. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38A: INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 4–13 (2019), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2TV-GSYG].  
18 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
19 Id. § 201(a). 
20 See id. § 102(a). 
21 See id. § 102(a)(5). 
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, pt. 1, at 1039 (1976). 
23 Lori Petruzzelli, Comment, Copyright Problems in Post-Modern Art, 5 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 
115, 121–23 (1995) (discussing the lack of originality in minimalist and conceptual forms of art).  
24 See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346–51 (1991) 
(holding that while factual compilations may receive copyright protection if they “feature[] an original 
selection or arrangement of facts,” the facts themselves do not). 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., id. § 107. 
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B.  Moral Rights in Works of Art 
 
Artists may also have moral rights in the works of art they create. The Berne 
Convention requires its signatories to give authors certain non-waivable moral rights 
of attribution and integrity,28 among other things, and many countries have complied 
with that requirement.29 The right of attribution typically empowers authors to 
compel the attribution of works they created and disavow works they did not.30 The 
right of integrity typically empowers authors to prevent the mutilation or destruction 
of works they created, and to disavow damaged works.31  
When the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, it did not 
immediately create any new moral rights.32 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
soon gave limited moral rights to some authors.33 Essentially, VARA gives the 
authors of “works of visual art” limited rights of attribution and integrity.34 It defines 
“works of visual art” as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works that exist either “in a 
single copy” or “in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author,” and it only extends VARA rights to original 
works of authorship that can be protected by copyright.35 Moreover, the VARA 
rights of attribution and integrity are limited by fair use and the other statutory 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners, which are waivable by the 
author and expire at the death of the author.36 As a consequence, VARA rights are 
considerably narrower than the moral rights required by the Berne Convention. 
 
C.  Resale Royalties on Works of Art 
 
In many countries, artists also have a resale royalty right in the works of art they 
create.37 The Berne Convention requires its signatories to give authors a resale 
royalty right.38 But it implicitly recognizes that not all of them will comply, providing 
that authors can claim resale royalties only if their country of origin grants a resale 
                                                                                                             
 
28 Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 6bis. 
29 Elizabeth Schéré, Where is the Morality? Moral Rights in International Intellectual Property and 
Trade Law, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 773, 783 (2018) (“[M]ost Berne-signatories have incorporated the 
minimum standard for moral rights into their national legislation.”).   
30 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012). 
31 Id. 
32 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
33 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101−650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
34 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012).  
35 Id. § 101.  
36 Id. § 106A. 
37 Frye, supra note 5, at 244−46. 
38 Berne Convention, supra note 16, at art. 14ter (“The author, or after his death the persons or 
institutions authorized by national legislation, shall, with respect to original works of art and original 
manuscripts of writers and composers, enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the work 
subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work.”). 
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royalty right.39 While many Berne countries have created a resale royalty right, many 
others have not, and the scope of the right varies considerably among countries.40 
Specifically, the United States has not created a resale royalty right,41 and the Ninth 
Circuit recently held that the Copyright Act preempts state resale royalty rights such 
as those California sought to impose.42  
 
II.  THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT 
 
A droit de suite, or “resale royalty right,” is a legal right to claim a percentage of 
the resale price of a copy of a work of authorship.43 Typically, the resale royalty right 
only applies to “unique copies” of a work, which may include “limited editions,” but 
not mass-produced copies. 
In theory, copyright gives authors the right to claim a percentage of the sale price 
of every copy of their works of authorship. Of course, in practice, most authors 
license their works to a publisher and receive their percentage only indirectly, if at 
all. But in any case, their compensation depends on the reproduction and sale of 
copies of their works. 
Unfortunately, copyright can’t help most visual artists, because they don’t sell 
reproductions of their work, they sell originals. The copyright market is a commodity 
market that depends on volume, but the art market is a luxury market that depends 
on scarcity. Authors in a commodity market want every fan to buy a copy, but artists 
in a luxury market want every fan to fight over one copy. The exclusive right to make 
copies is worthless if you don’t intend to make any. What artists want is an equity 
stake in their works, and thus a right to share in future profits.44 
 
A.  The Origins of the Resale Royalty Right 
 
The concept of a resale royalty right originated in late 19th century France.45 As 
the art market grew, the most desirable works became increasingly valuable on the 
                                                                                                             
 
39 Id. (“The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may be claimed in a country of the Union 
only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits, and to the extent permitted by 
the country where this protection is claimed.”). 
40 Frye, supra note 5, at 240, 245–46.  
41 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS (Dec. 2013), 
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTK5-NN2W].  
42 Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018). 
43 Resale Royalty Right, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TQ7-ZMDA]. 
44 Our use of “equity” here merely reflects the point that resale royalties essentially give artists a cut 
of the upside of all of their art, which is quite similar economically to retaining (involuntarily) an equity 
interest. (They pay for the interest, of course, in the form of a lower sales price.)  
As we note below, Amy Whitaker has recently made the case for artists retaining more formal “equity 
interests” in their art. See infra notes 249–254 and accompanying text.  
45 LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 2 
(John M. Kernochan ed., Louise-Martin-Valiquette trans., 1991). 
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secondary market.46 Some artists were upset when collectors sold their works for a 
handsome profit. They demanded a resale royalty right, hoping to share in the 
bounty.47 
The Société des Amis du Luxembourg (“Society of Friends of the Luxembourg”), 
an artists’ organization created in 1903, proposed the creation of a descendible resale 
royalty right of 1–2% of the sale price of an artwork, lasting for fifty years after its 
initial sale.48 And, in 1909, artists formed two groups to advocate for the creation of 
a resale royalty right: the Commission permanente du droit d’auteur aux artistes 
(“Permanent Committee on Authors’ Rights for Artists”) and Le Droit d’Auteur aux 
artistes (“Author’s Rights for Artists”).49 In 1914, the French government first 
considered a bill proposing a resale royalty right.50 And on May 20, 1920, France 
created the first resale royalty right, which gave artists an inalienable and descendible 
right to a percentage of the sale price of their artworks sold at public auction for the 
duration of the copyright in the artwork, “on the condition that these works, such as 
paintings, sculpture, or designs, are original and represent a personal creation of the 
artist.”51 
Gradually, some other countries began to create similar resale royalty rights, 
including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uruguay, and Italy.52 In 1948, the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was revised to 
include an optional resale royalty right.53 The Tunis Model Law on Copyright for 
Developing Countries of 1976 also incorporated an optional resale royalty right.54 
Today, more than seventy countries have created a resale royalty right,55 although 
some are honored only in the breach. For example, some countries have created a 
resale royalty right that cannot be enforced.56 Others require private enforcement of 
the resale royalty right, which is often impractical or impossible.57 
 
                                                                                                             
 
46 Id. at 4−5. 
47 See id. at 2−4. 
48 Id. at 3. 
49 Id. at 3–4. 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 Law of May 20, 1920, Imposing on Public Sales of Artworks a Right Inuring to the Benefit of 
Artists, 1920 B.L.D. 236, 20 DUV. & BOC. 539., reprinted in DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 45, at 
218.  Specifically, the law entitled artists to 1% of the sale price from 1,000 to 10,000 francs; 1.5% of the 
sale price from 10,000 to 20,000 francs; 2% of the sale price from 20,000 to 50,000 francs; and 3% of the 
sale price over 50,000 francs. Id.  
52 DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 45, at 4–5. 
53 See Berne Convention, supra note 16, at art. 14ter. “The Berne Convention was formally amended at the 
1948 Brussels revision conference to include droit de suite under then-Article 14bis. . . . [T]he droit de suite provision 
of the Berne Convention, which is essentially identical to the original Article 14bis, is now found under Article 
14ter.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41, at 4.  
54 See Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries, art. 4bis (1976). 
55 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41, at 17.  
56 Frye, supra note 5, at 246 (“Some countries have created a nominal resale royalty right, but have 
not enabled enforcement.” (citing Anna J. Mitran, Royalties Too?: Exploring Resale Royalties for New 
Media Art, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1370 (2016))).  
57 See id. at 246, 270.  
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B.  The Resale Royalty Right in the United States 
 
While the United States has never created a resale royalty right, it has periodically 
considered creating one. The Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act of 1978 proposed 
a resale royalty right of 5% of the sale price of artwork sold for $1,000 or more.58 
The Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986 proposed a resale royalty right of 7% 
of the difference between the purchase and sale price of an artwork if the sale price 
was more than $500 and at least 140% of the purchase price.59 The Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1987 proposed a resale royalty right of 7% of the difference between 
the purchase and sale price of an artwork if the sale price was more than $1,000 and 
at least 150% of the purchase price.60 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 directed 
the Copyright Office to conduct a study of resale royalty rights, “in consultation with 
the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts.”61 
In 1992, the Copyright Office released a report opposing the creation of resale 
royalty rights, primarily on economic efficiency grounds, which took the steam out 
of the campaign, but demands for a resale royalty right eventually resurfaced.62 In 
2011, Congress considered and rejected yet another proposal to create a resale 
royalty right, but asked the Copyright Office to revisit the question of resale 
royalties.63 In 2013, the Copyright Office released another report on resale royalties, 
which reversed its previous conclusions. The report recommended the creation of 
both a resale royalty right and resale royalty organizations to collect and distribute 
resale royalties. Among other things, the report concluded that the Copyright Act 
disadvantages visual artists who typically sell original works of art rather than copies, 
and that the creation of a resale royalty right could provide an incentive to create and 
distribute artworks, without harming the United States art market.64  
In response to the 2013 study, Congress considered the American Royalties Too 
Act of 2014, with the all-too-predictable “backronym” the “ART Act,” which once 
again proposed the creation of a resale royalty right.65 Under the ART Act, resale 
royalties would have been inalienable, so long as the artist retained the copyright in 
the work, and would have been payable to resale royalty right management 
organizations regulated by the Copyright Office. In addition, the failure to pay resale 
royalties would have been treated as a form of copyright infringement.”66 While the 
ART Act of 2014 failed, it was reintroduced in 2018 with bipartisan support.  
Nevertheless, it appears to have failed again. 
 
                                                                                                             
 
58 Visual Artists’ Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (1978). 
59 Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. § 3(d)(1)–(2) (1986). 
60 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong. § 3(d)(1)–(2) (1987). 
61 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. § 8(a)(1), (b)(1) (1990). 
62 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY 142−43 (Dec. 
1992), https://www.copyright.gov/history/droit_de_suite.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QPV-9PFF]. 
63 See Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000, 112th Cong.  §3(b)(2)−(3) (2011). 
64 Frye, supra note 5, at 250–51 (footnotes omitted) (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41).  
65 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, S. 2045, 113th Cong. § 3(7), (b)(A) (2014). 
66 Frye, supra note 5, at 251 (footnotes omitted).  
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C.  The Justification of Statutory Resale Royalty Rights 
 
Proponents typically offer equitable justifications for resale royalty rights.67 They 
observe that most artists do not benefit from copyright protection because they sell 
unique copies rather than reproductions, and therefore are entitled to some other form 
of protection.68 And they argue that equity entitles artists to a percentage of the resale 
price of their works, just like other authors share in the profits generated by their 
copyrighted works.69 But as scholars have convincingly argued, the standard 
equitable arguments cannot withstand scrutiny.70 
The equitable claim to additional rights is unconvincing because authors choose 
their market. Artists receive copyright protection on the same terms as any other 
author and choose whether or not to use it. Most authors sell the copyright in their 
work to publishers who hope to profit by selling reproductions in a commodity 
market. By contrast, most artists sell unique copies of their work to collectors in a 
scarcity market. Choosing not to use your copyright does not entitle you to additional 
rights, and successful artists can profit from any demand for reproductions.  
The equitable claim to a percentage of resale profits is also unconvincing because 
artists are already fully compensated by the sale price of their work. Both authors 
and artists sell at whatever price the market will bear, and that price reflects the risk 
of failure. The art market is notoriously risky. Some works become extremely 
valuable, but most become worthless. Authors and artists alike may feel cheated if 
their work becomes popular and a downstream buyer collects the profit. But they 
don’t offer refunds when their work is unpopular and the buyer takes a loss. 
Scholars have argued that resale royalty rights are actually inequitable, because 
they benefit successful artists at the expense of unsuccessful artists.71 If a resale 
royalty right exists, the sale price of a work on the primary market should be 
discounted to reflect the present value of the resale royalty right. However, while all 
artists pay for the resale royalty right on the primary market,72 only successful artists 
will collect a royalty on the secondary market.73 Consequently, the resale royalty 
right is effectively a tax on unsuccessful artists for the benefit of successful artists.74 
                                                                                                             
 
67 See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 1, 3−4 
(2014) (addressing the justification that resale royalties “are required to level the playing field and address 
a built-in disfavoring or discrimination in our copyright law against visual artists”).  
68 See id. at 4–5.  
69 See id.  
70 See id. at 9. 
71 See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman & Guy Rub, Resale Royalties Would Hurt Emerging Artists, ARTSY 
(Aug. 8, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-resale-royalties-hurt-emerging-
artists [https://perma.cc/66TU-J4SS]. 
72 Id. (“[I]f resale royalties are the law, dealers will realize that buyers’ willingness to pay will drop, 
and they will be forced to lower prices in the primary market art market. Who loses? The sellers in the 
primary market, a.k.a. practically all artists—both young and old, newcomers and the well-established, 
and everyone in between.” (emphasis added)).  
73 Id. (“The data shows that the likely beneficiaries in the [secondary] market will be, almost 
exclusively, the super-stars of the art world. The other 99% of artists will be left out in the cold.”).  
74 Id. 
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In practice, the risk discount on the primary art market is so large that a resale royalty 
right would probably have little effect on prices. Only a tiny fraction of works retain 
any value on the secondary market.75 Collectors buying works without a proven 
secondary market should pray the resale royalty right will become relevant. And the 
price of works created by artists with a proven secondary market would presumably 
already reflect the resale royalty right.  
Resale royalty rights are actually inequitable because they misallocate resources. 
Effectively, resale royalty rights are simply a tax on the secondary art market that is 
redistributed to successful artists. While there is nothing wrong with taxing the 
secondary art market, there is no reason to distribute the proceeds to successful 
artists, who already benefit from the increase in the market price of their works. On 
the contrary, equity favors redistribution to the unsuccessful artists who took the 
same risks as the successful artists but reaped none of the rewards.76 
 
III.  PRIVATE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHTS 
 
Resale royalty rights are created by the government, as a kind of para-copyright 
in works of art.77 This is both their strength and their weakness. If they are validly 
enacted, they are enforceable and have the power of the government behind them. 
But getting them enacted is difficult. And, even if enacted, they may not be valid if 
they exceed the powers of the government enacting them. 
But people can agree to many things that the government can’t force on them. 
Once people agree to something, the government can often enforce their agreement, 
even if it couldn’t enforce the outcome on its own authority. So even if the 
government won’t or can’t create resale royalty rights, maybe people can agree to 
them. Maybe people can create private resale royalty rights. 
Private resale royalty rights can take many different forms and may or may not 
resemble the canonical forms of the resale royalty right. The primary practical issue 
with broad private resale royalty rights is their enforceability; the normative issue 
turns largely on their potential injury on third parties uninvolved in the original 
                                                                                                             
 
75 See John Henry Merryman, Comment, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 103, 107 (1993). 
76 Frye, supra note 5, at 266−67; see also Merryman, supra note 75, at 122 (“We have seen, however, 
that only the successful artists whose works have a secondary market would receive any benefit from the 
droit de suite. Put another way, the money paid to artists from resales would go to those who appear to 
need it least. Many of the remaining mass of serious, working artists are self-employed, lack access to 
health and retirement plans and lead economically precarious lives. That suggests that if there were to be 
a charge on art resale transactions it might better be collected and administered for the benefit of needy 
artists. Instead of an artists’ droit de suite there would be a charge on resale transactions paid into an 
artists’ welfare fund.”). Merryman wonders whether such a tax would be constitutional under the 
Intellectual Property Clause. See id. at 122 n.37. If not, surely it would be a constitutional sales tax. 
77 Frye, supra note 5, at 258 (“The resale royalty right . . . is essentially a form of para-copyright that 
grants authors certain rights in particular copies of their works of authorship, rather than the underlying 
work itself.”).  
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transaction and on impairment of overall market functioning due to increasing 
transaction costs by requiring more investigation at time of sale.78 
The first known contractual resale royalty right was created in 1904 by André 
Level, a Parisian art collector, when he founded La Peau de l’Ours (“The Bearskin”), 
the first art investment fund.79 La Peau de l’Ours bought artwork on the primary 
market, typically directly from the artist, and offered the artist 20% of the profit on 
their work when the fund was liquidated in 1914.80 The fund generated a modest but 
respectable profit, and the artists received their due share.81 
Today, as one of us has explored at length, art funds are a much-discussed, but 
relatively little-used investment vehicle.82 Theoretically, art funds could help retail 
investors diversify their holdings and increase the liquidity of the art market, but in 
practice they are mostly just a way of separating suckers from their money. Unlike 
La Peau de l’Ours, contemporary art funds typically purchase artwork on the 
secondary market, and do not have any relationship with the artist, contractual or 
otherwise.83 If artists want a contractual resale royalty right, they need to secure it 
for themselves at the time of initial sale on the primary market. 
Currently, the paradigmatic way for artists to pursue a private resale royalty right 
is to use the “Artist’s Contract,” a form agreement created in 1971.84 Among other 
things, the Artist’s Contract provides that the buyer of a work will give the artist 15% 
of the profit on any future sale of the work and will require future buyers to make 
the same agreement.85 Many artists have used the Artist’s Contract, often modifying 
it to suit their own needs and preferences. Some lawyers and artists have created 
variations on the Artist’s Contract, intended to achieve similar goals.86 
 
                                                                                                             
 
78 See id. at 270.  
79 See Brian L. Frye, New Art for the People: Art Funds & Financial Technology, 93 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 113, 116–18 (2018). 
80 Id. at 117–19. 
81 See id. at 119–20. 
82 See generally id. (discussing how art funds can be a form of an investment vehicle).  
83 See id. at 123. 
84 See generally ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6 (providing a form contract intended to give artists 
a way to ensure certain moral rights including resale royalty rights).  
85 Id. at 2−3. 
86 See generally MARIA EICHHORN, THE ARTIST’S CONTRACT (Gerti Fietzek ed., 2009) (featuring a 
series of interviews with individuals who have either used the Artist’s Contract or come up with their own 
form of the contract to suit their needs). 
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Vassilakis Takis and friends removing Tele-Sculpture (1965) from the 
           Museum of Modern Art87 
 
A.  The Origins of the Artist’s Contract 
 
The Artist’s Contract was born out of an artist’s fit of pique. In 1968, the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York (MoMA) presented the exhibition “The Machine as 
Seen at the End of the Mechanical Age,” which was curated by K. G. Pontus 
Hultén.88 Among many other things, the exhibition included Takis’s Tele-Sculpture 
(1960), which was in the MoMA collection.89 In a letter to Hultén, Takis objected to 
MoMA showing Tele-Sculpture, rather than one of his newer works, but Hultén 
ignored him.90 Accordingly, at 4:00 p.m. on January 3, 1969, Takis and three of his 
friends marched into MoMA and simply removed Tele-Sculpture from the 
exhibition.91 The event unfolded as follows:  
                                                                                                             
 
87 Id. at 40. 
88 Sam Thorne, The Making of a Museum, FRIEZE (Jan. 6, 2017), https://frieze.com/article/making-museum 
[https://perma.cc/5MJ8-M5KD]. Karl Gunnar Vougt Pontus Hultén (1924–2006) was a Swedish museum director. 
Roberta Smith, Pontus Hulten, 82, Champion of Contemporary Art, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/arts/30hult.html?_r=1&bl&ex=1162357200&en=89dfa8591e6f1830&ei=5
087%0A&oref=slogin [https://perma.cc/VM8A-QTCT]. In 1959, he became the director of the Moderna 
Museet in Stockholm and, in 1973, he became the first director of the Georges Pompidou Center in Paris. Id.  
89 See Messing with MoMA: Critical Interventions at the Museum of Modern Art, 1939–Now, MOMA, 
https://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2015/messingwithmoma/ [https://perma.cc/JA6P-PRNB]. Takis 
was born Panagiotis Vassilakis on October 25, 1925, in Athens, Greece. Chronology, TAKIS  
FOUNDATION: RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE ART & THE SCIENCE, https://takisfoundation.org/chronology/ 
[https://perma.cc/E3MU-XUGC].  
90 John Perreault, Whose Art?, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 9, 1969, at 16, reprinted in ART WORKERS’ 
COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 2 (1969). 
91 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 10; Perreault, supra note 90, at 2; see also Sculptor Takes Work Out 
of Modern Museum Show, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1969, at 24.  
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In a crowded gallery, in front of stunned guards, Takis moved in on 
his own work, cut the wires, unplugged it, and, protected by Farman and 
Willoughby, gently carried it out into the museum garden, with a coolness 
that was unbelievable. It was very well rehearsed and on the surface 
looked more like a movie jewel-robbery than the anarchist’s ballet that it 
really was. Takis and his bearded cadre left a small wake of handbills, 
strategically handed out to the guards as they approached, and to the few 
bystanders that seemed to get what was going on.92 
 
According to Takis, “I am guarding my work. I want written assurance that this 
will be permanently removed from this show and that the museum will not ever again 
exhibit it without my permission.”93  
One of the handbills distributed by Takis objected to the following: 
 
1. The exhibition of works by living artists against their express 
consent. 
2. The degree of control exercised by museums, galleries and private 
collectors over the work of living artists. 
3. The lack of consultation between museum authorities and artists, 
particularly with regard to the maintenance and installation of their works. 
4. The unauthorized use of photographs and other material for 
publicity purposes.94  
 
After Takis and his friends staged a ninety-minute protest in the MoMA sculpture 
garden, MoMA Director Bates Lowry met with them for two hours.95 Eventually, he 
agreed to remove Tele-Sculpture from the show and to continue the conversation on 
January 24, 1969.96  
 
B.  The Art Workers Coalition 
 
Takis’s protest inspired the formation of a group of artists who objected to the 
social norms of the art world.97 MoMA remained the focal point of their opposition, 
the foil in their attempt to reconstitute governing art world norms. Within a couple 
of weeks, their objections included the lack of a resale royalty right:  
 
                                                                                                             
 
92 Perreault, supra note 90, at 2. 
93 Id.  
94 Statement, Takis Vassilakis (Jan. 5, 1969), reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 5 (1969). 
95 Perreault, supra note 90, at 2.  
96 Memorandum from Bates Lowry to the Staff of the Museum of Modern Art (Mar. 18, 1969), 
reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 33, 33–34 (1969) [hereinafter Bates Lowry 
Memo 1]; see also Press Release, Artists Protest Against Museum of Modern Art (Mar. 14, 1969), 
reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 31, 31. 
97 Initially, the group of artists included Gregory Battcock, Hans Haacke, Tom Lloyd, Willoughby 
Sharp, Takis Vassilakis, Wen-Ying Tsai, and John Perreault. Bates Lowry Memo 1, supra note 96, at 34. 
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6) A plan should be evolved to provide the artist with some percentage 
of the resale price of his work, whether this goes up or down. At present 
artists, unlike writers or composers, receive money only from the first sale 
of their work, and the effect of any later sale is felt only by the subsequent 
owners. This is particularly important for the majority of artists who only 
sell a few works and who can never hope to sell a work to a major 
museum, with the attendant publicity and price increase this could bring 
to all their work.98 
 
The artists wanted twelve people to participate in a negotiation.99 Lowry 
proposed six artists and six MoMA staffers, and the artists agreed.100 But on January 
24, ten artists and critics showed up at MoMA.101 Lowry refused to meet with them 
but agreed to meet with a smaller group of artists on January 28.102 
A few days later, a group of artists presented Lowry with a list of “13 Demands,” 
including a demand that MoMA take a position on resale royalties: “8. The Museum 
should declare its position on copyright legislation and the proposed arts proceeds 
act.”103  
Lowry ultimately responded by proposing the creation of a “Special Committee 
on Artist Relations” to consider the demands, in consultation with the artistic 
community.104 But the artists rejected his proposal because it did not provide for an 
immediate “public hearing” and it failed to address their other demands. They 
requested a response by March 7.105 Among other things, they wanted more  
money: “Artists are tired of being exploited. There are very few artists who make a 
living out of their art.”106 
Soon afterward, the artists began threatening another protest.107 MoMA 
announced the creation of a Special Committee on Artist Relations.108 But the artists 
were not mollified. They issued a press release, stating that MoMA’s response to 
                                                                                                             
 
98 Alex Gross, Artists Attack MoMA, THE EAST VILLAGE OTHER, Jan. 24, 1969, reprinted in ART 
WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 9, 10 (1969). 
99 Bates Lowry Memo 1, supra note 96, at 33. 
100 Id. 
101 Press Release, supra note 96, at 31. 
102 Id.; see also Bates Lowry Memo 1, supra note 96, at 34. 
103 13 Demands (Jan. 28, 1969), reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 13, 13 
(1969); see also Press Release, supra note 96, at 31. 
104 Letter from Bates Lowry, Director, the Museum of Modern Art, to Art Workers’ Coalition (Feb. 14, 1969), 
reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 18, 18 (1969) [hereinafter Bates Lowry Letter]. 
105 Letter from Art Workers’ Coalition to Bates Lowry, Director, the Museum of Modern Art (Feb. 22, 1969), 
reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 22, 22 (1969) [hereinafter A.W.C. Letter]. 
106 John Perreault, Outside the Museum, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 6, 1969, reprinted in ART 
WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 23, 23 (1969). 
107 Grace Glueck, Artists Threaten Sit-in at the Modern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1969, at 26; Innis 
MacBeath, Artists May Hold Museum Sit-In, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1969, reprinted in ART WORKERS’ 
COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 27, 27 (1969); see also Letter from Art Workers’ Coalition to Bates Lowry, 
Director, the Museum of Modern Art (Mar. 10, 1969), reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, 
DOCUMENTS 1 28, 28 (1969). 
108 MacBeath, supra note 107, at 27. 
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their demands was unacceptable and that they would “resort to whatever action they 
deem necessary.”109 
On March 22, about twenty-five artists showed up at MoMA and demanded free 
admission, brandishing fake annual passes stamped “ART WORKERS.”110 Most 
were denied admission, but they distributed handbills calling for a protest on March 
30 at 3:00 p.m.111 The artists objected to both MoMA’s actions and its aesthetic 
decisions.112 But a minority of the artists observed that the galleries were no 
different.113 
 
 
Demonstration, MoMA, March 30, 1969114 
 
On the morning of March 30, MoMA put a sign at the museum entrance: “The 
Demonstration is in the Garden. Please Enter by the 54th Street Gate.”115 MoMA’s 
staff distributed a statement to museum patrons, which observed that there would be 
a protest, announced that the museum had created a committee to address the 
protestors’ demands, and asked that the protestors stay in the garden.116 Around 3:00 
                                                                                                             
 
109 Press Release, supra note 96, at 32. 
110 Memorandum from Bates Lowry to the Staff of the Museum of Modern Art (Mar. 24, 1969), reprinted in 
ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 38, 38 (1969) [hereinafter Bates Lowry Memo 2]. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 40. 
113 Id. at 45. 
114 March 30th Demonstration, reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 52, 52 
(1969). 
115 Art Workers’ Coalition demonstrates for artists’ rights, 1969, GLOBAL NONVIOLENT ACTION DATABASE 
(May 11, 2015), https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/art-workers-coalition-demonstrates-artists-rights-1969 
[https://perma.cc/YR4S-W5GC]. 
116 Statement by Bates Lowry, Director, the Museum of Modern Art (Mar. 30, 1969), reprinted in 
ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 49, 49 (1969). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
564                                        KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                    Vol. 107 
 
p.m., about three hundred protesters showed up carrying signs reading, “Bury the 
Mausoleum of Modern Art” and “Dump Dada and Moma.”117 Many of the protestors 
used the gate, but some attempted to march into the museum through the back 
door.118 The protestors addressed the crowd through a portable bullhorn, and then 
left through the lobby.119 The protest was organized by the “Art Workers Coalition 
Committee for the Black Bloc,”120 and many of the speakers demanded more 
minority representation in the MoMA collection, among other things.121 
 
                                
Poster announcing AWC Open Hearing122 
 
                                                                                                             
 
117 Robert Windeler, Modern Museum Protest Target, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1969, reprinted in ART 
WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 55, 55 (1969). 
118 Id. 
119 Memorandum from Bates Lowry to the Staff of the Museum of Modern Art (Mar. 31, 1969), reprinted in 
ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 54, 54 (1969) [hereinafter Bates Lowry Memo 3]. 
120 Windeler, supra note 117.  
121 Alex Gross, Black Art-Tech Art-Prick Art, THE EAST VILLAGE OTHER, Apr. 2, 1969, reprinted in 
ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 56, 56 (1969); Windeler, supra note 117.  
122 Open Hearing Announcement, reprinted in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 69, 69 (1969). 
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An AWC protest slogan123 
 
Shortly after the protest, the group now describing itself as the Art Workers 
Coalition (“AWC”) announced an open hearing at the School of Visual Arts on April 
10 to address the question: “What should be the program of the art workers regarding 
museum reform and to establish the program of an open art workers coalition?”124 
About two hundred and fifty people attended the four-hour hearing, and about fifty 
people spoke or submitted a prepared statement, some of which were read aloud.125 
Many of the speakers objected to MoMA’s exclusion of African American and 
Puerto Rican artists and called for the creation of a new gallery.126 Others objected 
to the art market itself. 
For example, Sol LeWitt submitted a statement expressing his belief that artists 
should have certain inalienable rights in the works they create, including a resale 
royalty right: 
                                                                                                             
 
123 Art Workers Won’t Kiss Ass, HALF LETTER PRESS, https://halfletterpress.com/art-workers-wont-
kiss-ass/ [https://perma.cc/LT5W-7QUT]. 
124 John Perreault, MoMA & the Workers, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 10, 1969, reprinted in ART 
WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 68, 68 (1969). The AWC was not the only group protesting. For 
example, the Guerilla Art Action Group and Art Workers United also protested and criticized the AWC 
as bourgeois. EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 11 n.14. 
125 Grace Glueck, ‘J’accuse, Baby!’ She Cried, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1969, at D28.  
126 Grace Glueck, Dissidents Stir Art World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1969, at 41; see generally ART 
WORKERS’ COALITION, OPEN HEARING (1969) (compilation of the statements given over the course of 
the Open Hearing).  
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Some Points bearing on the relationship of works of art to museums 
and collectors: 
1. A work of art by a living artist would still be the property of the 
artist. The collector would, in a sense, be the custodian of that art. 
2. The artist would be consulted when his work is displayed, 
reproduced or used in any way. 
3. The museum, collector or publication would compensate the artist 
for use of his art. This is a rental, beyond the original purchase price. The 
rental could be nominal; the principle of a royalty would be used. 
4. An artist would have the right to retrieve his work from a collection 
if he compensates the purchaser with the original price or a mutually 
agreeable substitute. 
5. When a work is resold from one collector to another, the artist 
would be compensated with a percentage of the price. 
6. An artist should have the right to change or destroy any work of his 
as long as he lives.127 
 
Seth Siegelaub suggested that artists should think carefully about what they want, 
and use their art as leverage in order to get it: 
 
I wish to speak extemporaneously about my feelings about what’s 
going on here today, and what’s been going on in the last few weeks. 
There seems to be a community of artists working throughout the world. 
There’s a whole social fabric that rests very, very precariously on 
something we know as an art object, and art itself. I think if one wanted 
to describe this manifestation graphically, you would say that an art object 
would be a rock in a pool and at various functionary levels going out from 
this rock would be dealers, critics, the museums, the mass media, a whole 
fabric or system, all barricading that little object. Well, it would seem that 
anyone who’s interested as I am in my work to try and change the 
machinery or the context in which the art has been made and is being seen, 
would see that the greatest asset that artists have is their art. It would seem 
that for a social protest or any other type of action in withdrawing your 
work or setting tight controls over it, you could achieve the goals that are 
being sought. . . . It would seem that all this has to do, in a certain sense, 
with the context in which art is being seen, and the rights which the artist 
has in having it seen in the proper fashion. And it would seem that the art 
is the one thing that you have and the artist always has and which picks 
you out from anyone else. There’s a class of human beings who make art 
and a class who don’t, some of whom happen to be curators of museums, 
directors or museum trustees. This is the way your leverage lies. I would 
think that by using that leverage you could achieve much greater goals 
                                                                                                             
 
127  Sol LeWitt, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 126, 
at 54; see also Glueck, supra note 125 (observing that film editor Bill Gordy suggested “artists should sell 
their work on a royalty basis, insisting on contracts that would guarantee a percentage of the profits from 
later resales”). Many of LeWitt’s points made it into the Artist’s Contract as promulgated. 
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than in any other ways. It’s the one seemingly unique aspect of an artist, 
that he makes art and no-one else does.128 
 
 
Bill Gordy argued that artists could use contract law to create a resale royalty 
right: 
 
The real enemies of the artist are indifference to his work and lack of 
money. Let’s talk about money. It would be nice if this group could agree, 
but even if it can’t, there’s a good deal that artists can do to help 
themselves financially, without new legislation, on an individual basis. 
The existing law of contracts allows you to sell your work with the 
provision that you will receive a percentage of the profit gained from any 
later resales, a kind of commission. Perhaps the knowledge that he would 
benefit from any later increases in value of his work would take some of 
the pressure off an artist to start at the top, to become a superstar 
overnight. The art speculator is looked down on now, but let’s encourage 
him. His trading is the only mechanism that can drive art prices up. Let 
speculation thrive, as long as the artist gets his cut. 
 
Legally, artists together and separately, should uphold the principle 
that an artist continues to own the rights to his work the way an author 
owns a literary property. The painting or sculpture is like a manuscript; 
the owner can keep it, or show it to his friends, but the artist continues to 
hold the rights of reproduction, including the right to collect royalties if 
he wants them. . . .  
 
Many rights can be had just by taking them, without asking museums, 
galleries, or anybody else. Artists don’t have to beg for everything, even 
though it sometimes seems so. Let’s all stop begging, even when it 
pretends to be “demanding.” At the appropriate time, I would like to see 
someone move that a committee be formed, with legal advice, to draft a 
model sales contract that secures the maximum possible control for the 
artist over his work. Individuals can then, if they want to, agree to sell or 
give up certain rights, but let’s start out, from now on, in the position of 
landlords, rather than tenants. You can have artists without museums; you 
can’t have museums without artists.129 
 
And Alex Gross argued that the AWC should create a form contract for artists to 
use when selling works, as well as norms governing the purchase of works by 
museums: 
 
So much has been said about the ideology of A.W.C. and about the 
contrast between reforming the Museums on the one hand and setting up 
an alternate structure to them on the other, that I wonder if an important 
                                                                                                             
 
128  Seth Siegelaub, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 
126, at 59–60. 
129 Bill Gordy, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 126, at 97–98.  
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point has not been missed. . . . I am speaking about the actual return an 
artist can expect when he sells a work of art. The museums may or may 
not be eventually reformed or an alternate structure may or may not 
eventually be set up, and certainly both are desirable, but what about the 
artist here and now when he sells a work of art? 
 
As things now stand, he will receive the selling price and that is the 
end of it. But if the buyer one day resells the work of art, it is this buyer 
alone who may profit from any increase in price. I believe this is 
grotesquely unfair to the artist . . . . Extreme cases where the artist is living 
in penury while his pictures fetch outrageous prices may be an exception, 
but they are by no means unknown. In any case an artist can be said to 
possess some sort of proprietary interest in his work even after he has sold 
it. I believe the A.W.C. must give further currency to this notion and also 
help the artist to obtain a fairer return for his work by instituting a form 
which I shall refer to, for the sake of simplicity, as an A.W.C. sheet. I 
believe this sheet has a great role to play in the future of dealings in the 
art world and may serve to perpetuate the name of the A.W.C. long after 
the group itself has ceased to exist. 
 
As I see it, the A.W.C. sheet will consist of a form listing the name of 
the artist, the work of art (if it has a name), a description or reproduction 
of this, and, most important, the name of the purchaser and the price he 
has paid for the work of art. At the bottom of the A.W.C. sheet will be a 
statement that the buyer guarantees to pay the artist a certain percentage 
of the profit he may make if he ever decides to resell the work of art. This 
statement the buyer will be required to read and sign. The percentage 
could vary between 10 and 33% and should perhaps be decided at future 
meetings of the A.W.C. or perhaps be left open for the artists and the 
purchaser to decide among themselves. 
 
Large quantities of these sheets should be printed up and the word 
should be spread among artists that this sheet is to serve as the standard 
form or at least as a model for all sales of all works of art. Obviously the 
force of the A.W.C. Sheet will be partly symbolic and honorary at first, 
and it may be difficult for artists in all cases to determine if their works of 
art may not have been secretly or accidentally resold in distant parts of the 
country or the world. In the absence of a central agency handling and 
checking up on all works of art covered by A.W.C. Sheets, it will also be 
difficult to be certain that the regulations I have described have been 
carried out in all cases. In this connection I am somewhat hopeful that the 
mere existence of the A.W.C. Sheet may spur into existence the body 
necessary to enforce its provisions, and that this body will perhaps 
comprise the nucleus of something resembling the first trade union for 
artists in this country. . . .  
 
What I have described also has a second part. I have spoken of the 
duty of the buyer to share his profits with the artist when reselling the 
work of art, but there is also another factor. By far the largest and most 
important buyers of works of art are our museums. There is absolutely no 
reason why the museums should not agree to strengthen the A.W.C. 
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principle here and now by promising to pay a percentage of the price for 
any work created by a living artist to the artist himself. . . .  
 
If the museums were to disagree and refuse to adopt it, then it would 
seem fair to me that artists all over the country should repossess their work 
from museums all over the country or engage in such demonstrations, sit-
ins, or other acts as seem likely in each individual case to bring the 
museum in question to its senses. What is being proposed is scarcely a 
radical principle—it would merely reinforce what is already a relatively 
popular notion, that a creator should have some sort of proprietary right 
in his work even after he has sold it—this is almost a principle of common 
law. . . . Popular feeling will very probably run highly in favor of the artists 
if they make this a principle plank of their platform. The direction is 
forward, and the time to take steps in that direction is now.130 
 
These comments provide an illuminating bridge between the legal technology 
chosen—the form contract to be used by like-minded individuals selling their 
works—and the intended goal, widescale social change. 
The AWC’s summary of the hearing observed that several speakers had called 
for the creation of a resale royalty right: 
 
5. Several artists made a point of the fact that once a work leaves an 
artist’s hands, it is no longer in his control. Several people suggested that 
the law of France respecting the re-sale of art be enacted in the United 
States. This would result in no work being resold in the artist’s lifetime 
without his permission, and a proportion of accrued profit on all 
subsequent sales would go to the artist. It was also urged that no work by 
an artist could be shown or photographed without his permission and that 
certain fees should be paid for all instances of the exhibition of a work of 
art. Various practical schedules of rates and uniform contracts were 
outlined in the testimony.131 
 
Accordingly, the AWC’s strategic plan called for the creation of “model 
contracts” for the exhibition and sale of works of art, as well as the redistribution of 
resources to unsuccessful artists: 
 
1. Rentals. All exhibitions charging entry fees should pay the 
exhibiting artists rental fees for their work. This would apply to all work 
whether or not owned by the artist. A model contract should be drafted. 
Filmmakers should likewise be properly compensated not only for 
individual screenings but also for prints acquired for museum archives. 
 
2. Resales. A percentage of the profit realised on resale of an artist’s 
work should revert to the artist. A model sale contract should be drafted. 
                                                                                                             
 
130 Alex Gross, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 126, 
at 109–13. 
131 Synthetic Report of the Public Hearing Held April 10, 1969, reprinted in ART WORKERS’ 
COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 102, 108 (1969).  
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3. Ownership. The artist never gives up ownership in his work. 
Reproduction and royalty rights and the right to retrieve his work for the 
original price and change or destroy it would also be provided for. 
 
4. Social benefits. Research should be undertaken regarding the 
Scandinavian methods of giving support to artists, the possibility of 
creating a trust fund from contributions by successful artists, or from taxes 
levied on sales of “dead” art; such a fund would provide stipends, sickness 
benefits, help for dependents, etc. the possibility of obtaining guaranteed 
annual minimum wage or negative income tax for artists.132 
 
Again, the use of model contracts is linked to much broader set of altered social 
norms and structures. Apparently, the AWC itself planned to create a “standard form 
agreement” for artists, but it is unclear whether it ever actually drafted an 
agreement.133 In any case, the AWC continued to see the creation of resale royalties 
as part of its mission. In November 1970, it published a “Statement of Demands.”134 
Among other things, it claimed that artists are entitled to an ongoing ownership 
interest in their work, including a resale royalty right: 
 
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A MINIMUM INCOME IS 
GUARANTEED FOR ALL PEOPLE, THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF 
ARTISTS SHOULD BE IMPROVED IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS: 
 
1. Rental fees should be paid to artists or their heirs for all work 
exhibited where admissions are charged, whether or not the work is owned 
by the artist. 
 
2. A percentage of the profit realized on the re-sale of an artist’s work 
should revert to the artist or his heirs. 
 
3. A trust fund should be set up from a tax levied on the sales of the 
work of dead artists. This fund would provide stipends, health insurance, 
help for artists’ dependents, and other social benefits.135 
                                                                                                             
 
132 Legal and Economic Reforms, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 111, 113 (setting 
forth the strategic plan of the A.W.C.); see also Rosemarie Castoro, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, 
in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 126, at 15 (advocating for the creation of a “trust fund” for 
artists funded by resale royalties); Hans Haacke, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ 
COALITION, supra note 126, at 47 (proposing that the museum sell its old art works and buy new art); 
David Lee, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 126, at 40, 42 
(proposing art rentals); Iain Whitecross, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ 
COALITION, supra note 126, at 76 (suggesting that resale royalties be used to fund a trust for artists).  
133 See van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10. 
134 Adrienne Skye Roberts, The Economic Position of Artists Should Be Improved in the Following 
Ways, OPEN SPACE (Nov. 2, 2011) (reproducing Art Workers Coalition, Statement of Demands (1970)), 
https://openspace.sfmoma.org/2011/11/the-economic-position-of-artists-should-be-improved-in-the-
following-ways/ [https://perma.cc/G6GK-2UVL]. 
135 Id. 
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Notably, the AWC’s demands contemplated both a resale royalty right and a 
redistributive tax on the sale of certain artworks.136 While many have proposed the 
creation of a resale royalty right, few have proposed taxation and redistribution of 
the proceeds from the sale of artwork.137 
The AWC also made both economic and non-economic demands. The AWC not 
only wanted artists to profit from increases in the value of their works, but also to 
maintain control over their works after selling them.138 In fact, the AWC’s framing 
of its demands suggests that control was more important than profit.139 
Of course, the AWC’s “demands” were really just “wishes.” The AWC knew 
what it wanted; but had no coherent plan for how to get it. We see, in these early 
discussions, the artists and their allies trying on a number of different approaches. 
They emphasize the legal rights of French artists; they seek to evoke the rhetoric and 
practices of the labor movement; they claim support among the wider populace; they 
look for points of leverage wherever they can—with the moment of sale being the 
most promising. Their aims include initiating particular claims for particular rights, 
but more importantly, capitalizing on what they perceived to be broader momentum 
for social change. The economic and legal tools mentioned are to be deployed in 
service of a broader reworking of the “social fabric” of the art world.  
Of course, as with the demands of most would-be revolutionaries, most of 
AWC’s demands proved unrealistic. Particularly so with respect to royalties on 
future art sales, rent-payment, and other restrictions on exhibition. While museums, 
galleries, and collectors could have voluntarily chosen to pay resale royalties and 
rental fees, they had no legal obligation to do so, nor did popular support materialize 
to force institutions to pursue such practices.140 The AWC’s only practical road to 
success was probably federal legislation, which it never meaningfully pursued. 
                                                                                                             
 
136 Id. 
137 One of us recently proposed combining the two, suggesting several different potential models for 
the equitable redistribution of resale royalties. See generally Frye, supra note 5, at 269–76. 
138 Roberts, supra note 134.  
139 See Legal and Economic Reforms, supra note 132, at 113 (prefacing its list of economic reforms 
as necessary for artists to be “free,” suggesting that control over the artists’ work was paramount to 
profiting from their work).  
140 The first sale doctrine provides that a copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right in a particular 
copy of a work of authorship is extinguished by the sale of that copy. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (“[T]he 
owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”). And the Copyright 
Act explicitly provides that a copyright owner’s exclusive right to public display of a work of authorship 
does not extend to particular copies of the work once they are sold. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) 
(“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under 
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, 
to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to 
viewers present at the place where the copy is located.”). 
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Accordingly, the AWC’s demands had no direct effect on the art market or the art 
world more generally.141 But it did provide inspiration for others. 
By mid-1971, the AWC had dissolved.142 Some splinter groups remained active 
after its dissolution, including Women Artists in Revolution, Guerilla Art Action 
Group, and Art Strike, and other groups have continued to advocate the ideas 
advanced by the AWC.143 
 
 
Seth Siegelaub, Appeal to Artists (1970).144 
                                                                                                             
 
141 See, e.g., Press Release, MoMA, Art Workers Coalition: Summary of Points Raised (July 1969), 
https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/4307/releases/MOMA_1969_Jan-
June_0139.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTC7-6FPL] (responding to the demands of the AWC and indicating 
that the museum does not need to change or, in some cases, that it cannot feasibly comply with the AWC’s 
demands). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 This is the Way Your Leverage Lies, MOMA, https://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2013/siegelaub/ 
[https://perma.cc/4M2U-WZEE]. 
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IV.  THE ARTIST’S CONTRACT 
 
Shortly after the AWC published its demands in November 1970, Seth Siegelaub 
created a series of handbills that he circulated among artists.145 Among other things, 
the handbills asked whether artists wanted a resale royalty right and other moral 
rights in their works. Siegelaub’s handbills were inspired by the AWC.146 Siegelaub 
had spoken at the AWC’s open hearing on April 10, 1969, observing that artists 
should think about what they want.147 His handbills raised many of the same issues 
addressed by the AWC’s demands.148 
 
Seth Siegelaub (1969)149 
 
A.  Seth Siegelaub & Robert Projansky 
 
Seth Siegelaub was an iconoclastic artist, scholar, gallerist, and impresario.150 
Today, he is remembered as an early proponent of “conceptualism,”151 an art 
                                                                                                             
 
145 See id. 
146 See EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 39 (interview with Seth Siegelaub). 
147 Seth Siegelaub, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS’ COALITION, supra note 
126, at 59−60 (1969). 
148 See EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 39. 
149 Matthieu Laurette, I Remember, FRIEZE (Mar. 11, 2016), https://frieze.com/article/i-remember-0 
[https://perma.cc/P3C5-SRWJ]. 
150 Siegelaub was born in the Bronx in 1941, and died in Basel, Switzerland, on June 15, 2013. 
Andrew Russeth, Seth Siegelaub, Pioneering Dealer and Curator of Conceptual Art, Dies at 71, 
OBSERVER (June 17, 2013, 12:45 PM), http://observer.com/2013/06/seth-siegelaub-pioneering-dealer-
and-curator-of-conceptual-art-dies-at-71/ [https://perma.cc/R75M-62QF]. 
151 NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET 94 (2011). 
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movement that focused on the “concept” or “idea” expressed by a work, rather than 
the physical object itself.152 As the American artist Sol LeWitt explained: 
 
In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of 
the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of 
the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a 
perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art.153 
 
In 1964, Siegelaub opened Seth Siegelaub Contemporary Art in midtown 
Manhattan, an art gallery that also sold oriental rugs.154 The gallery was not 
financially successful and closed in 1966, at which point Siegelaub became an 
independent curator focused on conceptual art.155 Between 1968 and 1971, he 
organized twenty-one “exhibitions” that often had no tangible existence other than a 
catalogue.156 
According to Siegelaub, he discussed the idea of creating contractual resale 
royalties and moral rights with “over 500 artists, dealers, lawyers, collectors, 
museum people, critics and other concerned people involved in the day-to-day 
workings of the international art world.”157 At a party in February 1971, Siegelaub 
asked his friend Jerold Ordover, a prominent art lawyer, to help him draft an artist’s 
resale royalty contract.158 Ordover declined because he “didn’t have the time,” but 
Robert Projansky overheard Siegelaub’s request and volunteered to help him: “I was 
there and it seemed interesting and something different, a little bit of a challenge, so 
I said, ‘Sure, I’ll do it.’”159 
Projansky was a junior lawyer with an interest in the arts.160 Coincidentally, he 
had served in the same Air Force reserve unit as Siegelaub in the mid-60s, but they 
                                                                                                             
 
152 See id. at 93.  
153 Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM, Summer 1967. 
154 This is the Way Your Leverage Lies, supra note 144. Siegelaub’s gallery was located at 16 West 
56th Street. See Walter Barker, Art Work by Erwin F. Hebner Shown in New York Gallery, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, May 25, 1965, at 19. 
155 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 45 (interview with Seth Siegelaub); HOROWITZ, supra note 151, at 
94−95; see also A Conversation Between Seth Siegelaub and Hans Ulrich Obrist, TRANS>, no. 6, 1999, 
at 51−63 (“Art reality was sort of framed by galleries which were rich and famous, or were poor, artists 
cooperatives, which were upstairs or downstairs, uptown or downtown. This type of experience, along 
with that of having a gallery myself for about 18 months or so from the Fall 1964 to Spring 1966, led me 
to think about other possibilities.”) [hereinafter Siegelaub & Obrist Interview]. 
156 This is the Way Your Leverage Lies, supra note 144 (detailing Siegelaub’s “exhibitions, 
publications, and other projects”).  
157 ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 1. There is no evidence to support this claim, but Siegelaub 
probably did talk to a lot of different people. 
158 Ordover practiced law in New York City from the 1950s until his death in 2008, representing many 
different artists and galleries. Press Release, Leslie Tonkonow, Merry Christmas Mr. Ordover (July 1, 
2010), http://www.tonkonow.com/press_ordover.html [https://perma.cc/U86Q-34YS]. Most notably, 
Ordover represented the gallerist Leo Castelli and helped the artist Lawrence Weiner create a system for 
registering his text-based works. Id. 
159 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 231 (interview with Robert Projansky, Apr. 23, 1998). 
160 Projansky was born on January 2, 1935, and grew up in White Plains, New York. He was admitted to the 
New York State Bar by the Second Judicial Department on March 16, 1966. In re Projansky, 286 A.D.2d 35 (N.Y. 
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did not know each other at the time.161 While Projansky had little experience 
practicing art law, he had attended some AWC events, was familiar with its demands 
for artist’s rights, and understood more or less what Siegelaub wanted the contract 
to accomplish.162 
 
 
Robert Projansky163 
                                                                                                             
 
App. Div. 2001). He resigned from the practice of law on June 20, 2001 after being disciplined for allegedly using 
his attorney escrow account for the purpose of tax evasion. Id. He was the founding artistic director of The Grassroots 
Shakespeare Troupe in New York City, and was also a member of The Living Theatre. As You Like It—Cast, 
WILLAMETTE SHAKESPEARE, http://www.willametteshakespeare.com/2009-cast/ [https://perma.cc/ZBF3-XYRU]. 
He currently lives in Portland, Oregon, where he continues to be involved with theater and political activism. 
161 Robert Projansky described this as follows:  
 
ME: Were you friends?  
RP: Yes, he was a friend whom I knew through friends from around the art world. But coincidentally 
he and I had also been in a reserve Air Force Unit at the same place and in the same unit together. He was 
in charge of the parachutes. I didn’t know him there. I just recognized him when I met him otherwise. He 
had a great big moustache and he was very distinctive looking. When I saw him around in the art world I 
recognized that he was the guy that I had seen up at the airport in White Plains.  
ME: When was that?  
RP: I think around 1965, ‘66, ‘67 something like that. That’s when I was there and he was there all 
or part of that time.  
 
EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 231 (interview with Robert Projansky, Apr. 23, 1998). 
162 See id. at 233 (“ME: Did you work together with the Art Workers Coalition? They also drafted a 
contract of sorts, and they had public hearings to discuss these kinds of rights, in particular. Do you 
remember those? RP: I remember going to a public discussion or two of theirs. Pretty much I sat in the 
back and listened.” (citing NAWC to Issue New Contract, ART WORKERS NEWSLETTER (Nat’l Art 
Workers Cmty., New York, N.Y.), May 1971)).  
163Robert Projansky, The Perilous World of Art Law, JURIS DR., June 1974, at 14, 15.  
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B.  The Creation of the Artist’s Contract 
 
Siegelaub and Projansky created the Artist’s Contract on February 24, 1971.164 
First, they hammered out its purposes and key terms. Then, Siegelaub wrote an 
introductory essay explaining the purpose and use of the form contract, while 
Projansky drafted the contract itself.165 
When they were done, they sent it to the printer: 
 
My best recollection is that when we decided to do it, when I 
expressed some interest, he turned his attention from the other guy to me, 
and either we went ahead and did it that same day or within a day or two. 
We talked about it, we worked it out, we wrote the text, I drafted the 
Contract, we did everything in one day and night. I remember we were up 
most of the night during the printing and everything.166 
 
They entitled the form contract “The Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale 
Agreement”167  and had it printed as a poster, with the form contract on one side and 
Siegelaub’s essay on the other.168 They wanted it to be distributed as widely as 
possible, and included the following notice: “Please POST, REPRODUCE, and USE 
this poster freely. This poster is not to be sold.”169 It was a labor of love—a legal tool 
produced not by entrepreneurs seeking business but by social justice warriors 
seeking community impact. Siegelaub observed, “We have done this for no 
recompense, for just the pleasure and challenge of the problem, feeling that should 
there ever be a question about artists’ rights in reference to their art, the artist is more 
right than anyone else.”170 
                                                                                                             
 
 
164 See ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4 (inferring this because Siegelaub’s essay at the 
beginning of the document is dated February 24, 1971, presumably the date on which the contract itself 
was drafted).  
165 See EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 231; ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 1−2. 
166 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 231. 
167 ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 1. 
168 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 45.  
169 ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4. As an aside, the Artist’s Contract is surely an original 
work of authorship protected by copyright, based on the explanation and instructions, and the copyright 
vested jointly in Siegelaub and Projansky. The notice resembles a Creative Commons  
attribution-noncommercial license, which permits copying, distribution, and adaptation, but prohibits 
commercial uses. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
[https://perma.cc/74Z9-64EM]. While the notice does not explicitly require attribution, Siegelaub and 
Projansky may have expected it. The notice also prohibits the sale of the Artist’s Contract. While copyright 
probably empowered Siegelaub and Projansky to prohibit commercial reproduction of the Artist’s 
Contract, the first sale doctrine probably permitted the sale of a copy received from a third party. In any 
case, this blurring of the distinction between the intangible work and tangible copy may have reflected 
the artworld origins of the Artist’ Contract. 
170 ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4. 
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The School of Visual Arts paid for the initial production and distribution of the 
poster.171 The entire document was also published in the April 1971 issue of Art 
News, as well as Studio International and Arts Canada.172 Before long, it became 
known as the “Artist’s Contract.”173 
  
C.  The Purpose of the Artist’s Contract 
 
The Artist’s Contract begins with Siegelaub’s essay, which explains that the 
purpose of the contract is “to remedy some generally acknowledged inequities in the 
art world, particularly artists’ lack of control over the use of their work and 
participation in its economics after they no longer own it.”174 Siegelaub observes that 
artists can use the contract whenever they sell, trade, or give a work to someone and 
argues that the contract is justified because artists are entitled to retain both economic 
and moral rights in their works.175 
The Artist’s Contract is intended for use whenever an artist transfers ownership 
of a work by any means, including sale, trade, or gift.176 It instructs the artist to 
complete two substantively identical copies of the agreement, striking out unwanted 
clauses and adding key terms like sale price.177 Then, the artist and the recipient 
should both sign both copies, and the artist should attach a notice of the agreement 
to the work itself.178 
According to Siegelaub, the Artist’s Contract was intended to benefit both artists 
and collectors by giving them the rights and benefits they actually want.179 It gives 
artists the following contractual rights and benefits: 
 
• 15% of any increase in the value of each work each time it is 
transferred in the future. 
• a record of who owns each work at any given time. 
• the right to be notified when the work is to be exhibited, so the 
artist can advise upon or . . . veto the proposed exhibition of his/her work. 
• the right to borrow the work for exhibition for 2 months every 
five (5) years (at no cost to the owner). 
• the right to be consulted if repairs become necessary. 
• half of any rental income paid to the owner for the use of the 
work at exhibitions, if there ever is any. 
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• all reproduction rights in the work.180 
 
Notably, the duration of those economic rights and benefits is the life of the artist 
“plus the life of a surviving spouse (if any) plus 21 years,” with the exception of 
“aesthetic” rights, which expire on the death of the artist.181 
The Artist’s Contract also gives collectors the following rights and benefits: the 
“right to receive . . . a certified history and provenance of the work,” a  
“non-exploitative, one-to-one relationship” with the artist, privity of contract with 
the artist, “recognition that the artists maintains a moral relationship to the work,” 
and “assurance to the owner that he is using the work in harmony with the artist’s 
intentions.”182 
Of course, a cynic might observe that the putative rights and benefits given to the 
collector are of dubious value, with the exception of the right to a certified history 
and provenance of the work, which most collectors already expect to receive.183 
While the Artist’s Contract clearly benefits artists by giving them new and valuable 
rights, it is unclear how it benefits collectors, or why they should voluntarily agree 
to its terms—at least from an economic perspective. 
From that perspective, it is difficult to imagine why collectors would agree to 
anything in the Artist’s Contract unless they believed the price reflected the present 
value of the contractual terms. If an artist’s work is in high demand, collectors might 
agree to the Artist’s Contract, especially if the price is below market. On the margins, 
surely it is a disincentive. A rationally minded collector would prefer to buy and sell 
on familiar terms and without additional restrictions. 
Yet Siegelaub insisted that the Artist’s Contract would not affect demand. 
Among other things, he argued that the contractual resale right applied only if the 
work increased in value, and the artist could always bargain with the collector over 
the nominal purchase price of the work.184 But he acknowledged the obvious 
collective action problem, the sense in which the whole project relied on widespread 
rather than isolated use: “The more artists and dealers there are using it, the better 
and easier it will be for everybody.”185 The contract’s success was explicitly linked 
to the success of the wider social consciousness he and his comrades were at that 
time seeking to inspire in the community of artists. If collectors have a choice, they 
will avoid the Artist’s Contract, and if galleries and artists want to make a sale, they 
will avoid the Artist’s Contract as well. Only acting as a group with few defectors 
could artists force buyers to play ball. Ultimately, the idea was to reshape the 
background norms of the art market such that artists’ preferred terms would be 
widely accepted. This was no small task, but the Artist’s Contract was intended as a 
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way for individual artists to do their part, wielding private agreements written in 
legal language in order to accomplish broader social goals. It is from this perspective 
that Siegelaub’s optimistic statements begin to make sense—he is seeking to inspire 
a movement, not to describe existing reality. 
Siegelaub always insisted that the Artist’s Contract was intended to solve 
practical problems confronting artists. It was a middle-of-the-road option in many 
ways, intended to leave intact (at least initially) many of the institutions that others 
found more problematic. There would still be a private market for art, looking much 
like the existing one, albeit with power shifted somewhat toward the artists. As 
Siegelaub observed in a 1999 interview: 
 
Its intention was just to first, articulate the kind of interests existing in 
a work of art, and then, to shift the relative power relationships concerning 
these interests more in favor of the artist. In no way was it intended to be 
a radical act; it was intended to be a practical real-life, hands-on,  easy to-
use, no-bullshit solution to a series of problems concerning artist’s control 
over their work; it wasn’t proposing to do away with the art object, it was 
just proposing a simple way that the artist could have more control over 
his or her artwork once it left their studio. Period. But the broader  
social-economic questions of the changing role and function of art in 
society, the possibility of alter native [sic] ways of art making or the 
support of the existence of the artist; all these important questions are not 
addressed here. As a practical solution, the contract did not question the 
limits of capitalism and its private property; it just shifted the balance of 
power in favor of the artist over some aspects of a work of art once it was 
sold.186 
 
Siegelaub, reflecting back almost four decades after the composition of the Artist’s 
Contract, draws an apt distinction between this work and more radical projects he 
and others imagined and pursued. For in fact, the Artist’s Contract leaves much of 
the existing structure of the art world and art market in place.  
It is easy to imagine that the radical artists, thinkers, and critics with whom 
Siegelaub was generally allied might consider the approach embodied in the Artist’s 
Contract to be inconsistent with their more communitarian values—a marginal 
improvement at best, falling far short of the revolution that was needed. The notion 
of discrete, art objects, essentially commodified, sold by individual artists for their 
profit to the highest bidder for individual use (even if restricted in large part by the 
Artist’s Contract) might still have been widely viewed as reifying a narrow and 
bourgeois conception of the artistic endeavor.187 Of course, one could argue that it 
was merely a first step, and that its success could have sparked further moves to 
consolidate a renewed social consciousness in the art world and beyond; in other 
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words, one could defend it on tactical grounds if not strategic ones. Such are always 
the debates of would-be revolutionaries.  
     In any case, it is worth bearing in mind that while widespread adoption of the 
Artist’s Contract would have represented a serious change, and while it was intended 
to provide an easy practical tool to take that step, nonetheless, to many, that step 
alone wouldn’t have been enough.  
 
D.  The Function of the Artist’s Contract 
 
From a narrow legal perspective, the purpose of the Artist’s Contract is twofold: 
to form an enforceable agreement with the desired contractual terms as between the 
artists and the initial collector, and then to enforce the agreement against third parties 
(i.e., subsequent buyers). 
Forming an agreement may be problematic because many collectors will resist 
the terms of the Artist’s Contract, but if the collector agrees, the agreement will 
probably be enforceable as between her and the artist. Contract law is intentionally 
flexible and accommodating. Almost any contractual term can be legally binding, so 
long as the parties to the contract agree to it and it is neither illegal nor against public 
policy. Accordingly, the terms of the Artist’s Contract are probably enforceable 
against the initial buyer of the work, who is a party to the contract. 
Enforcing the agreement against third parties, however, is probably impossible. 
As a practical matter, it is difficult for artists to know what a collector does with a 
work.188 In order to enforce a contractual resale royalty right, the artist must know 
when the collector sells the work, and in order to enforce contractual moral rights, 
the artist must know how the collector uses the work. But most artists cannot 
realistically monitor collectors and enforce those rights. 
Siegelaub argued that artists could collectively use self-help and social norms to 
enforce the Artist’s Contract.189 Even if compliance is hard to monitor, at least some 
breaches will be discovered. If artists punish the breaches they discover, it will 
discourage collectors from breaching and encourage them to honor the terms of the 
Artist’s Contract. The art market depends on relationships and trust, and collectors 
who breach agreements will soon find themselves shut out. This reasoning is 
compelling so far as it goes. Of course, as the marketplace becomes broader and 
more diverse, such reputational and relational sanctions will become less effective. 
If a collector does breach the Artist’s Contract, it is almost certainly 
unenforceable at law, against a third party, due to a lack of privity of contract and 
the general legal reluctance to recognize burdens on items of personal property. The 
doctrine of privity of contract provides that contracts can only impose obligations on 
parties to the contract.190 Accordingly, when a collector buys a work from an artist 
and agrees to the Artist’s Contract, the collector is a party to the agreement, so privity 
                                                                                                             
 
188 See Gross, supra note 130, at 110−11 (discussing the difficulty of keeping track of the future 
transfers of a work, even after a buyer agrees to the resale royalty). 
189 See ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4. 
190 Overview: privity of contract, OXFORD LAW REFERENCE, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100347633 [https://perma.cc/76CV-VKS5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2018–2019              ART IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATION               581 
 
of contract exists. But when the collector sells the artwork to someone else, that 
person is not a party to the agreement with the artist, so privity of contract does not 
exist. The artist and the collector have privity of contract, and the collector and the 
third party have privity of contract, but the artist and the third party do not. Similarly, 
with a few narrow exceptions, property law generally doesn’t recognize covenants 
“running with” items of personal property. 
In theory, the collector and the subsequent buyer could make the artist a third-
party beneficiary of their agreement.191 But they are under no obligation to do so. If 
the buyer promises to pay the artist a resale royalty, the artist may be able to enforce 
that promise in some jurisdictions.192 But the artist cannot force the buyer to make 
the promise, nor bring a breach of contract action against a buyer who does not make 
the promise. At most, the artist can attempt a breach of contract action against the 
collector for failing to require the buyer to make the artist a third-party beneficiary. 
The Artist’s Contract purports to create privity of contract between artists and 
third parties. Specifically, it requires collectors to transfer their duties to the artist 
along with the work.193 It prohibits collectors from selling unless the third party 
agrees to assume those duties.194 Furthermore, it provides that third parties are bound 
by the terms of the Artist’s Contract, whether or not they agree to them.195 
Unfortunately, none of those clauses are likely enforceable against third parties. 
Artists may have breach of contract claims against collectors who sell their work 
without requiring the buyer to agree to the terms of the Artist’s Contract. But even if 
the buyer agrees to the terms, it is a contract with the collector, not the artist. While 
the artist may benefit from the new contract, the artist is still a non-party who can 
enforce it at best as a third-party beneficiary.196 
The policy reasons for the invalidity of the Artist’s Contract become obvious 
when it is considered in the abstract. The Artist’s Contract is designed for use by 
artists transferring their works to others.197 But nothing intrinsic to the contract limits 
it to artists or their works. If the provisions of the Artist’s Contract are valid, then 
anyone can bargain for them. A collector could resell a work subject to the Artist’s 
Contract and claim the contract rights intended for artists. Anyone selling any kind 
of personal property could use the Artist’s Contract to ensure future control over that 
property. If you can use the Artist’s Contract to sell art, you can also use similar 
provisions to sell a car or a wastebasket. Would-be buyers of all sorts of objects 
would have to investigate in order to assure that the seller hadn’t entered some side 
agreement with an unknown third party who would later seek to enforce the 
agreement against the buyer. This possibility represents a potentially serious 
                                                                                                             
 
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
192 See Frye, supra note 5, at 247−48. 
193 ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 7. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
197 ARTIST’S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
582                                        KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                    Vol. 107 
 
hindrance to the functioning of markets in personal property of every sort, and is at 
least a large part of the reasons court don’t generally enforce such encumbrances.198  
The resale royalty provision of the Artist’s Contract is also in tension with the 
first sale doctrine, which provides that a copyright owner’s exclusive distribution 
right only applies to the initial sale of any particular copy of a work.199 Normally, 
when copyright owners sell a copy of a work, the buyers own the particular copy 
they purchased and can dispose of it in any way they like, so long as they do not 
infringe any of the other exclusive rights of the copyright owner.200 For better or 
worse, courts have allowed parties to contract around the first sale doctrine in relation 
to digital works because identifying a “particular copy” of a digital work is difficult, 
if not conceptually incoherent.201 But the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the first sale doctrine applies to the sale of tangible copies of a work of authorship, 
which would certainly include most works of visual art.202 
In addition, some of the moral rights claimed by the Artist’s Contract conflict 
with provisions of the Copyright Act. For example, the Artist’s Contract enables the 
artist to prohibit the exhibition of the work,203 even though the sale of a copy of a 
work terminates this display right.204 Likewise, the Artist’s Contract claims rights of 
attribution and integrity broader than those granted by VARA. 
Of course, contractual agreements can and do preempt copyright defaults, 
especially in bilateral contracts.205 Courts have limited the application of the first sale 
doctrine by allowing copyright owners to characterize transactions as “licenses” 
rather than “sales.”206 Accordingly, courts have recognized limitations on the first 
sale doctrine almost exclusively in relation to transactions involving digital property, 
and have rejected efforts to restrict the transfer of physical property.207 Artwork is 
typically physical property. Moreover, the Artist’s Contract specifically refers to the 
contemplated transfer as a “sale.”208 It is unclear whether courts would find the 
Artist’s Contract enforceable as written. 
The Artist’s Contract is designed to give artists what they want; but if wishes 
were horses, beggars would ride. The law treats artists the same as anyone else, and 
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intentionally prohibits contractual terms like those in the Artist’s Contract, even if 
artists want them. 
E.  The Response to the Artist’s Contract 
 
The Artist’s Contract immediately caught the attention of not only the 
international art press,209  but also of art lawyers.210 It was widely reprinted by both 
arts organizations and legal scholars.211 And it was translated into many different 
languages including French, German, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch.212 
The art world’s conventional wisdom, however, was rather skeptical of the 
viability of the Artist’s Contract: 
 
The agreement was imaginative—but it had a major flaw. It depended 
on the goodwill of prospective buyers (who didn’t want to have their 
hands tied) and of museums (which generally denounced it as 
“unenforceable”) and of artists (who often weren’t willing to risk losing a 
sale by insisting on having it signed) and of dealers (who generally like to 
keep big purchases secret).213 
 
Even Siegelaub and Projansky candidly shared skepticism about their 
handiwork’s adoption: 
 
Controversial from the beginning, it was viewed as unenforceable, 
time-consuming and detrimental to sales—all of which proved to be true 
to varying degrees. Says Mr. Projansky, “We never expected this to 
become the standard of the art world, but we wanted to raise the subject 
and maybe influence some legislation.”214 
 
Lawyers and legal scholars were even more skeptical of the Artist’s Contract. 
Many were already opposed to mandatory resale royalties, on economic grounds.215 
They observed that many provisions in the Artist’s Contract were unenforceable as 
written, especially the contractual resale royalty, thus appearing to sink consensual 
imposition of such royalties on a broad scale.216  
Thus while it faced considerable skepticism from some pragmatists, the project 
captured the imagination of many. It drew considerable attention as a novel way of 
seeking to shift market power through a different legal form than that of legislation. 
As we turn to the (relatively few) known instances of its actual use, it becomes 
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apparent that its “meaning” on a level other than that of strict legal enforceability 
was its strength.  
 
 
Hans Haacke, On Social Grease (1975)217 
 
F.  The Use of the Artist’s Contract 
 
The element of the Artist’s Contract that received the most attention was its 
attempt to create a contractual resale royalty. But it also attempted to secure a litany 
of other moral rights. Indeed, Siegelaub himself considered that the identification of 
those other moral rights, and the acknowledgment of them as issues worth 
negotiating—was important as the contractual resale royalty right and integral to the 
purpose of the Artist’s Contract: 
 
My first intention was to try to formulate the types of interests that 
artists have in their work, such as the control over the use of their work, 
the right of reproduction, etc. And although the Contract provided for a 
certain percentage of money on the increased value of its resale—the 
aspect that naturally got most of the attention because no businessman, 
collector or gallery was happy about it—it was essentially an attempt to 
formulate a list of all the possible interests of the artist in their work: the 
right to show his or her work, the right to control what happens to it when 
the artist no longer owns it, etc. And then once these interests were clear, 
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to try to change the relationship between the artist and the people who 
successively own the work of art.218 
 
Initially, some artists wanted to use the Artist’s Contract and some galleries 
agreed.219 Today, the Artist’s Contract is most strongly associated with Hans Haacke, 
a conceptual artist with strong ideological commitments.220 Haacke not only insisted 
on using the Artist’s Contract but also insisted on enforcing it. For example, Haacke 
sold his work On Social Grease (1975), a set of six photoengraved magnesium plates 
mounted on aluminum featuring quotes from political and business leaders, subject 
to the Artist’s Contract.221 When the work eventually went up for auction in 1987, 
Haacke insisted that the auction house display the Artist’s Contract along with the 
work and read it aloud immediately before the sale.222 Haacke was not alone. Other 
artists, including Adrian Piper, also used the Artist’s Contract.223 
Other artists used versions of the Artist’s Contact for more pragmatic reasons, 
primarily because they wanted to keep track of the ownership and exhibition of their 
works: 
 
The French artist Daniel Buren also uses [the Artist’s Contract], 
according to his dealer, John Weber (who is also Mr. Haacke’s dealer) 
—but he uses it without the 15 percent resale clause, primarily to control 
the exhibition and installation of his exceedingly site-specific work. And 
both Edward Kienholz and Carl Andre have been known to use similar 
contracts intermittently.224 
 
Some artists used the Artist’s Contract briefly, then stopped. For example, the 
sculptor Jackie Winsor sold fifteen works pursuant to the Artist’s Contract in the 
1970s but stopped using it as her work became more popular and prices increased.225 
Her use of the Artist’s Contract was justified as follows:  
 
In the beginning especially, when she was selling her sculptures for 
almost less than it cost to make them, Ms. Winsor seems to have used the 
contract as a device to establish, in her words, “my sense of their own 
value” and as a way “to get people not to be stupid with them,” and it 
usually worked.226 
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Although Winsor realized she couldn’t command high market prices at that point in 
her career, she felt that the legal document itself—fully enforceable or not—
somehow affected her relationship to collectors, and even to herself. This is a classic 
example of the shaping of legal consciousness, that is, the way that legal language 
and devices interact with—change and are changed by—the social context 
surrounding their use. Legal language and legal devices shape conceptions of self 
and society held by those deploying and interacting with them.227 This is true even if 
there is no likelihood, or intention, of enforcement of legal rights through the formal 
legal system.  
Many artists found that the Artist’s Contract simply wasn’t worth the trouble. 
Some collectors resisted it, and no one liked the red tape: 
 
Ms. Winsor and her dealer, Paula Cooper, admit, as does Mr. Haacke, 
that some sales were lost because of their insistence on using the contract. 
They also recall—despite the apparent simplicity of Siegelaub-Projansky 
form—the endless amounts of paperwork and negotiating time that went 
into each sale, factors that made its use impractical. Thus, by the late 
1970’s, the artist’s contract was, with few exceptions, out of sight and out 
of mind in New York . . . .228 
 
Absent the terms of the contract gaining widespread social acceptance, only a 
subset of artists could actually insist on using the Artist’s Contract anyway, primarily 
the most successful ones.229 If an artist’s work was in high demand, then collectors 
would swallow their objections, especially if the price was right. But if demand 
slipped, then collectors had plenty of other options. 
Ironically, other artists used the Artist’s Contract because their customers were 
insufficiently sophisticated about the art market to object. For instance, the Boston 
Visual Artists Union used a version of the Artist’s Contract for all of its sales for a 
time: 
 
In the six months the BVAU has been using this rather quietly worded 
contract, it has received almost universal acceptance by the art buyers. 
(There has been some controversy over binding heirs to the contract and 
establishing the rights of the artist to “show” the work.) But as Kyra 
Montagu of the BVAU notes, “Most of the people who come into our 
gallery store are not serious investors. They are buying for themselves, 
untinged by commercial considerations and are pretty happy to sign.”230 
 
As a practical matter the BVAU contract was irrelevant, because none of the 
work appears to have had any meaningful value on the secondary market. The 
contract may have even increased sales by encouraging naïve consumers to assume 
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that the work would increase in value, rather than immediately become worthless. 
This is another expressive purpose potentially served by the contract, although 
apparently one unintended by Siegelaub and Projansky. 
Some artists objected to the Artist’s Contract. Some thought it was just unrealistic 
red tape: 
 
Like many other artists, Mel Bochner . . . remembers being opposed 
to the contract—even though he “liked the idea of trying to protect artists’ 
rights”—primarily because it seemed unenforceable. “The last thing I was 
interested in,” said Mr. Bochner, “was the formation of more bureaucracy, 
of another kind of art police. Also, I didn’t want to be the custodian of my 
own past.” Mr. Bochner also voiced his suspicion of the idea that 
“everything was going to increase in value forever,” and, giving the 
argument a little twist, said he felt that if artists wanted to share in the 
profits, they should be prepared to pay the collector a percentage of any 
decline in value if the work sold for less than its original price.231 
 
Others objected to the Artist’s Contract on ideological grounds. For instance, 
some thought it cheapened art by further commodifying it.232 Others thought it was 
inequitable, because it only benefited successful artists and did nothing for 
unsuccessful artists. For example, the National Art Workers Community argued that 
the Artist’s Contract should have provided that a percentage of the contractual resale 
royalties be paid into a pension fund for artists in order to provide a benefit to all 
artists.233 
 
G.  The Aftermath of the Artist’s Contract 
 
The heyday of the Artist’s Contract was short-lived, at least in part because its 
chief champion quickly departed the battlefield. In 1972, shortly after publishing the 
Artist’s Contract, Siegelaub abruptly quit the art world and moved to Paris to pursue 
other interests, including Marxist media theory and the history of handwoven 
textiles.234 
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speak for anybody but myself, but I do find it to be a very serious problem in one’s life to be interested in 
something and really approach it in a critical new way, which I have always tried to do, whether with 
political publishing, left media research or textile history. I am currently working on a bibliography of 
textile history, and I have asked myself many times why this project has not been done by a museum many 
years ago.”). 
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Projansky parlayed his role in drafting the Artist’s Contract into a successful law 
practice representing artists. In 1974, he revised the Artist’s Contract, making it 
shorter and easier to understand: 
 
I recently decided that my supposed cleverness notwithstanding, the 
contract was so carefully drawn—to maintain a chain of privity, for 
example—that only a lawyer could appreciate it (or, some have said, even 
read it). So I have written a second edition, soon to be published and, I 
hope, distributed throughout the country. Amazingly, I found that it was 
possible to reduce the gross wordage by about 60 percent and still say the 
same things just as effectively—and make the contract itself more 
effective in terms of the artist getting people to sign it. Now few buyers 
will feel the need to show it to counsel first.235 
 
The revised contract was published in the July 1975 issue of the Art Workers 
News.236 While it was indeed slightly shorter and easier to understand, it inevitably 
failed to solve the fatal enforceability problems that faced the original Artist’s 
Contract.237 Charles Jurrist, another art lawyer, also published a model artist’s 
contract in the same issue of Art Workers News.238 Jurrist’s model contract was 
similar to the Artist’s Contract, but limited it to the initial resale,239 the only one it 
could effectively bind.  
Another approach, by artist June Wayne, looked to a different approach entirely, 
proposing a central registry: 
 
Forget laws and contracts both, urges June Wayne, preferring instead 
a registry and escrow service for artists set up by a title company, bank, 
insurance company or government agency such as the patent office. When 
the artist sells a work, explains Wayne, the artist and buyer would agree 
on terms for residual rights and record them with the title company along 
with the first transfer of title from the painter to the new owner. On future 
sales, the purchaser would have to search the title and pay the artist’s share 
to the title company; the latter would then forward the money on to the 
artist before transferring title.240 
 
Such a system, akin to the car titling system or the real estate recordation system in 
place in many localities in the United States, was never adopted for art.241 The 
                                                                                                             
 
235 Robert Projansky, The Rights of Artists, JURIS DOCTOR, June 1974, at 16. These comments suggest 
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236 Norman Nadel, Artists Demand Share of Resale Profits, EL PASO HERALD-POST, Mar. 15, 1975, at 39. 
237 See Robert Projansky, The Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement: Second Edition, 
ART WORKERS NEWS, July 1975. 
238 Nadel, supra note 236.  
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imposition of a centralized, inevitably complicated, bureaucratic system, might be 
effective at protecting the rights in question. But even if successful as a legal matter, 
such a project seems somehow limiting. Notably, it would be less empowering of 
artists themselves and less likely to usher in broader social changes in the art world, 
simply displacing their power and control to a distant bureaucracy. It lacks the  
élan—the upstart, grassroots vitality—of the Artist’s Contract as originally 
conceived. It could win the battle, by giving some successful artists some greater 
profits from their art, but lose the war if it failed to reshape the “legal consciousness” 
of those participating in the art market and thus to bring wider scale empowerment 
and reform.242 
And that was that. For a few years in the early 1970s, the Artist’s Contract was 
the talk of the town, and then it was forgotten—until recently. 
 
H.  The Resurrection of the Artist’s Contract 
 
In 2015, the Essex Street Gallery on the Lower East Side of Manhattan presented 
a group show titled “The Contract,” devoted to the Artist’s Contract.243 The show 
included historical works by Hans Haacke and Maria Eichhorn, as well as new works 
by Cameron Rowland, Wade Guyton, R.H. Quaytman, and others.244 All of the 
works in the show were offered for sale on the condition that the buyer agree to the 
terms of the Artist’s Contract, and most of them sold.245 
The Essex Street Gallery show sparked new interest in the Artist’s Contract. 
Eichhorn published a collection of interviews with people involved in the creation 
or use of the Artist’s Contract.246 And several artists have picked up on the idea to 
propose 21st century versions of the Artist’s Contract. 
For example, Alex Strada drafted a contract intended for use when selling her 
own work.247 In many respects, her contract is similar to the Artist’s Contract, but it 
provides that the collector must promise to sell the work in ten years and use the 
                                                                                                             
 
242 Cf. van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10, at 23–24 (“[W]ere laws to pass that addressed all provisions 
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“accrued value” to purchase a work by an emerging female artist, in consultation 
with Strada.248 It is unclear whether she has sold any work pursuant to this contract. 
By contrast, Amy Whitaker argues that artists can use blockchain to create 
enforceable private resale royalty rights: “By registering artworks with blockchain 
to establish authenticity and create property rights which can then be split off and 
traded, artists can retain an ‘equity share’ in the works, much like the founder of a 
startup retains an ownership stake that grows in value as the company expands.”249 
Under Whitaker’s proposal, artists selling work would “retain an equity stake in their 
work” and use blockchain to track it.250 
Part of this proposal seems to be merely the familiar call for a centralized registry, 
clothed in trendy technological language. Of course, “blockchain” was the buzzword 
of 2017, and by now has become a running joke in many circles.251 According to 
Whitaker, “[b]lockchain could provide an elegant private-sector solution that lets 
artists easily track an artwork and its traded price as it passes through the hands of 
collectors and institutions, bringing much-needed transparency to a market long on 
information asymmetry and opacity.”252 Perhaps. But is tracking the ownership of 
and transactions in a work of art really the intractable part of this problem? It is 
unclear what blockchain adds to the mix. It is one thing to suggest the use of 
blockchain to authenticate inherently intangible and fungible digital assets. It is 
another to use it to authenticate physical objects. If the art market were to demand 
an online, centralized database run by a trusted intermediary, such a system would 
seem easier to introduce and more reliable than the cumbersome—and, judging by 
news stories, still quite risky—mechanisms offered by the blockchain. Proposals for 
centralized art registries have kicked around for a long time,253 and they seem to have 
failed more because of lack of political will than need for better recordkeeping 
technologies. Surely traditional methods are more than adequate, to the extent that 
                                                                                                             
 
248 Artist Contract 2017, ALEX STRADA, http://www.alexstrada.com/index.html#contract 
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249 Anna Louie Sussman, Could Blockchain Put Money Back in Artists’ Hands?, ARTSY (Mar. 
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parties actually consider reliable authentication and provenance an asset, rather than 
a liability.254 
All that said, Whitaker offers interesting insights concerning artists retaining an 
“equity” interest in their work. Her work can be seen as an attempt to catalyze a new 
understanding of artists and their relationship with those who trade in their art. Her 
writings interestingly deploy legal and financial concepts to try to reshape the social 
and economic world of artists, much as Siegelaub and Projansky’s project did.255 
Thus, practical objections to a blockchain-based registry proposal resemble legal 
objections to the enforceability of the Artist’s Contract, in that they miss the broader 
point. Ultimately, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that the highest and 
best purpose of the Artist’s Contract was to begin a conversation about what rights 
artists wanted and why they were entitled to those rights.256 Even if the Artist’s 
Contract was impractical and unenforceable, it was evidence that artists were serious 
about moral rights.  
As Siegelaub recognized, formal legal enforcement of contractual provisions is not 
the only way rights are created and disputes are resolved in the art world.257 They are the 
exception to the rule. When collectors make promises to artists they have incentives to 
keep those promises, other than the threat of a breach of contract action. Collectors want 
to maintain a friendly relationship with artists, not only to ensure that the artist’s 
disapproval doesn’t harm the market value of the work they already own, but also to 
ensure that they will have access to more works in the future. 
More often than not, the most valuable legal rights are those you will never have to 
assert. Indeed, “legal” rights may be valuable even if they cannot formally be enforced. 
While the Artist’s Contract is largely unenforceable, collectors no doubt still respect its 
terms because in negotiating the transaction and signing the contract, they “accepted” its 
terms on a deeper level than a legal one. They may act according to it not because bound 
them legally but because it persuaded them—it came to shape or to express their values 
as well. In this sense, the Artist’s Contract can be seen as an element of the works it 
purports to regulate, and may even increase their value. The Artist’s Contract purports to 
benefit collectors, as well as artists, and ironically, maybe it does. Perhaps there are 
reasons to use legal language and legal documents, even if there is neither an intention or 
a capability to actually enforce any legal obligations. 
 
V.  THE ARTIST’S CONTRACT AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Scholars of law and society have explored the ways in which legal documents serve 
purposes that go beyond enforcement in courts. Among these purposes are to associate a 
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particular transaction or relationship with values that are thought to be associated with 
law, such as formality, clarity, even legitimacy in the eyes of a given community or 
political unit. The law, in other words, serves an expressive function, shaping individual 
self-conceptions as well as broader societal beliefs. 
As Lauren van Haaften-Schick has observed, the Artist’s Contract reflects the desire 
of many artists to maintain control over the work they produce, in order to shape its 
presentation and meaning.258 It uses legal rhetoric to express the gravity of their 
investment and concern. Essentially, the Artist’s Contract reflects an attempt to shape the 
“legal consciousness” of the art world, to catalyze a shared understanding of artists and 
collectors as to their mutual obligations and expectations. 
The Artist’s Contract is important because it reflects an effort among artists, dealers, 
and collectors to create a mutually agreeable memorialization of a (purported?) shared 
understanding between the parties, a recognition and acknowledgement of the ongoing 
connection between the artist, the collector, and the artwork. Regardless of whether this 
is right or wrong, the legal document should be seen as a way of recognizing and 
formalizing that ongoing connection in legal terms. It’s a way of challenging existing 
assumptions about property ownership and the relationship between artists and their 
work, and introducing new ideas of what equity, what justice, demands. The legal 
trappings are used instrumentally, for all sorts of purposes, including socially and 
politically organizing artists, but perhaps most of all developing a different relationship 
between artists, art, and collectors after the sale of art. The idea is for the artist to have 
more power (including financial rights) after the sale, but also to enlist the collector as an 
ally through the use of legal language, clearly specified expectations, and explicit 
agreement.  
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